Study on the State of the Security Industry: The Present Condition of the UK’s Security Industry

However, the sobering fact remains that security did not do enough. Once inside the building, Abedi was spotted by security guard Mohammad Agha, as well as by a member of the public who was waiting to collect his daughter.

The member of the public, Christopher Wild, decided to confront Abedi himself. Though he appeared furtive and nervous, the bomber stated that he was simply “waiting for someone” and asked Wild for the time. Unsatisfied, Wild approached Agha and relayed his concerns.

Agha, for his part, had spoken to Abedi and found him to be suspicious but did nothing to remove him from the venue at that time. Wild later told the inquiry that he felt “fobbed off” by Agha’s response. Another bystander, Thomas McCallum, also described Agha as “dismissive”. 

However, evidence shows that Agha did take Wild’s warning at least somewhat seriously, as he approached his colleague, Kyle Lawler, and discussed the issue.

Lawler tried to radio the control room, presumably in search of further information or instructions, but could not get through. He would try multiple times to get through, but each time could not do so. This raises further issues of proper working practice.  

Lawler has stated since that he did not want to confront Abedi himself for fear of being branded a racist, a fact that again speaks to a lack of proper training. A person in a crowded area, acting suspiciously and carrying a large bag on his back represents a potential security risk, this is not a judgement based on skin colour, but on clearly visible evidence.

Nevertheless, it’s easy to consider the predicament Lawler found himself in. To single out a man of middle eastern descent during the racially charged climate of 2017 could see his job in jeopardy. Better training could have resolved this dilemma for him.

Shortly thereafter, Abedi detonated his device and one of the worst terrorist attacks in modern British history took place.

As this brief analysis has hopefully demonstrated, the attack did not occur simply due to inadequate security practices. True, Lawler could have taken more initiative, as could Agha, but the relative lack of police presence (despite one being ordered) and the failure of national security services to properly contain the threat posed by Abedi are also highly relevant factors.

The inquiry highlights this deficiency in the training of security operatives, particularly as it pertains to terror attacks, stating,

“Had Mohammed Agha been more alert to the risk of a terrorist attack, he had a sufficient opportunity to form the view that SA was suspicious and required closer attention. This conclusion, had Mohammed Agha been adequately trained, would have caused him to draw SA to his supervisor’s attention at this stage. This, in turn, would have brought into sharp focus that SA had chosen to position himself out of sight of the cameras”.

The Inquiry concurred that Mr. Wild’s suspicions, obviously well founded, had indeed been dismissed and not taken seriously enough by Mr. Agha.

At one point, Agha had tried to attract the attention of his supervisor, security operative David Middleton, but was unable to do so. Middleton, who was on the doors at the time, was roughly 30 metres away from Agha, who, the inquiry felt, did not do enough to gain his supervisor’s attention. CCTV footage does show Agha making a modest attempt to get Middleton’s attention but appears to give up following a minimal effort.

This deficiency is echoed by former counter-terrorism coordinator Nick Aldworth, who told Sky News,

“One of the things that frustrates me across that period – 2017 – was we’d seen this rolling wave of terrorist attacks coming at us from Europe and we’d been putting out a strong, strong message to people about ‘be alert, be aware – don’t be embarrassed about reporting things, go with your senses’. Of course, what it appears is that people heard that message and they responded, and they reported seeing this guy out of place, in the proximity of the arena – and nobody with responsibility for dealing with that seemed to do anything”

The inquiry concurred, stating

“Mohammed Agha should have done more immediately following his conversation with Christopher Wild. This was a missed opportunity. Mohammed Agha did not respond appropriately because he did not take Christopher Wild’s concerns as seriously as he should have. Responsibility for this rests on both Mohammed Agha and Showsec”. 

Ultimately, everything in the report that concerns Agha, Lawler or Showsec speaks to poor or rushed training. If faced with a more immediately obvious threat, such as a drunken brawl or a person brandishing a weapon of some kind, it seems likely that the operatives in question would have been sufficiently trained enough to contain the disruption with minimum negative outcomes. However, the operatives’ training and experience clearly didn’t adequately cover terrorism, or the threat posed by same.

Mohammad Agha should have acted on his own suspicions and certainly should have given Christopher Wild’s concerns more consideration. Kyle Lawler should have approached Abedi from the perspective of a security operative doing his job, rather than being afraid to be accused of racism.

In response to the inquiry, the SIA released an official statement, in it the organisation states,

“The report findings provide learning and reflection for all concerned. It also makes some observations and recommendations about the regulatory framework and aspects of SIA’s approach to regulation in and prior to 2017.

Whilst many things have changed since 2017, there is always more that can be learned, and more improvements that can be made.

We are committed to working with the private security industry, law enforcement and other partners in a robust way to make sure the learning from the inquiry’s findings is taken forward.

We will continue our follow-up engagement with those involved, study carefully the recommendations published today, and consider any further steps we need to take.

Where there are recommendations about extending the SIA’s role or the legislation on the regulatory regime for private security, we will liaise closely with the Home Office on these”.

The Manchester Arena bombing highlights and recommends the pressing need for reform within the security industry, demonstrating that, especially considering police budget cuts and new responsibilities undertaken in the wake or the coronavirus pandemic, security operatives are woefully ill-equipped to handle threats such as the one posed by Salman Abedi in 2017.

The first of these two recommendations is MR7:

Sir John Saunders said,

“At present, a licence is only required by those who monitor CCTV under a contract for services. In-house CCTV operators do not need a licence. Although an attempt was made to justify the reasoning for this distinction by Tony Holyland, a senior employee at the SIA, I was unpersuaded. This distinction has been considered in the past, but no change has been made”

He went on to recommend that,

“In-house operators carry out the same job as those who monitor CCTV under a contract for services. The Inquiry heard evidence that more than one SMG employee who carried out monitoring of CCTVs asked for training but were not given it. There seems to me to be no persuasive reason why a licence should not be mandatory for those operating in-house as well as those working under a contract for services. I recommend that the distinction is abolished. All of those who monitor CCTV should be required to hold an SIA CCTV operator’s licence”

On the issue of companies employing those carrying out security work, Sir John Saunders said,

“The SIA runs an Approved Contractor Scheme (ACS). This is a voluntary scheme and, while individuals who carry out security work may require a licence or licences depending on what functions they carry out, companies who provide security and supervise these activities do not”

And recommended that,

“While the ACS provides assurance that the member is a fit and proper person, there is nothing to prevent someone who is not a member of the scheme setting up and running a company providing security services. The SIA promotes good practice through its ACS. But there is no compulsion on companies to become a member or carry out good practice. While checks are made on how a company conducts its business when it applies to join the scheme, self-certification plays a considerable part in the process”

Since then, new training has been added and we are seeing the protect duty act being formed into some type of legislation, but this is probably not going to be enough to help an industry besieged by mass departures, insufficient training, unsuitable applicants being added to the workforce and vast expenditure expected from the operatives themselves.

The impact of the Manchester Arena bombing, along with the public scrutiny the events have placed upon the security industry and the recommendations made by Sir John Saunders are a golden opportunity for the security industry to make transformative changes for the better.